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Abstract
Today’s high-stakes adversarial interactions feature
attackers who constantly breach the ever-improving
security measures. Deception mitigates the de-
fender’s loss by misleading the attacker to make
suboptimal decisions. In order to formally rea-
son about deception, we introduce the feature de-
ception game (FDG), a domain-independent game-
theoretic model and present a learning and planning
framework. We make the following contributions.
(1) We show that we can uniformly learn the adver-
sary’s preferences using data from a modest num-
ber of deception strategies. (2) We propose an ap-
proximation algorithm for finding the optimal de-
ception strategy and show that the problem is NP-
hard. (3) We perform extensive experiments to em-
pirically validate our methods and results.
1 Introduction
The world today poses more challenges to security than ever
before. Consider cyberspace or the financial world where a
defender is protecting a collection of targets, e.g. servers or
accounts. Despite the ever-improving security measures, ma-
licious attackers work diligently and creatively to outstrip the
defense [Potter and Day, 2009]. Against an attacker with pre-
viously unseen exploits and abundant resources, the attempt
to protect any target is almost surely a lost cause [Hurlburt,
2016]. However, the defender could induce the attacker to at-
tack a less harmful, or even fake, target. This can be seen as
a case of deception.
Deception has been recognized as an important tactic in
military operations for millenia [Latimer, 2001]. More re-
cently, deception has been extensively studied in cybersecu-
rity [Jajodia et al., 2016; Hora´k et al., 2017]. Cyberattack-
ers use tools such as Nmap [Lyon, 2009] to probe the target
network. Security researchers have proposed many decep-
tive measures to manipulate the network’s replies to these
probes [Jajodia et al., 2017; Albanese et al., 2016], which
could confound and mislead an attempt to attack. In addition,
the use of honey-X, such as honey pots, honey users, and
honey files have been proposed and implemented to attract
and induce the attackers to attack these fake targets [Spitzner,
Feature Observable value Hidden value
Operating system Windows 2016 RHEL 7
Service version v1.2 v1.4
IP address 10.0.1.2 10.0.2.1
Open ports 22, 445 22, 1433
Round trip time for probes
[Shamsi et al., 2014] 16 ms 84 ms
Table 1: Some relevant features for cybersecurity
2003]. For example, Nakashima [2013] reported that coun-
try A once created encrypted, but fake, files labeled with the
names of country B’s military systems and put them in folders
marked for sharing with country A’s intelligence agency. Us-
ing these sensitive filenames as bait, country A successfully
lured the hackers on the other end to these decoy targets.
Be it commanding an army or protecting a computer net-
work, a common characteristic is that the attacker gathers
information about the defender’s system via surveillance to
make decisions, and the defender can (partly) control how her
system appears to the attacker. We formalize this view of the
defender’s system as features, and propose the feature decep-
tion game (FDG) to model the strategic interaction between
the defender and the attacker.
It is evident that the FDG model could be applied to many
domains, by appropriately defining the relevant set of fea-
tures. To be concrete, we will ground our discussion in cy-
bersecurity, where a cyberattacker observes the features of
each network node and then chooses a node to compromise.
The left column of Table 1 presents some relevant features.
Note that these features can be continuous or discrete. If an
intruder has an exploit for Windows machines, a Linux server
might not be attractive to him. If the attacker is interested in
exfiltration, he might choose a machine running database ser-
vices. Based on such information, the defender could strate-
gically make machines that lead to extensive harm if com-
promised appear undesirable to the attacker, by changing the
feature values, e.g. Table 1. However, before doing so, she
needs to learn the attacker’s preferences from attack patterns
in order to make an informed decision.
Our Contributions We make four key contributions. First,
we propose the FDG model, which abstracts the information
relevant to decision-making as features. In an FDG, the de-
fender manipulates the features of each target in the system.
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Upon observing the features, the attacker chooses a target to
attack based on his preferences in a stochastic way.
Our second contribution is a sample complexity analysis of
learning in FDG. We show that to learn a restricted class of
attacker’s preferences, the defender needs only gather a poly-
nomial number of data points on a modest number of feature
configurations. The sample complexity is dependent on the
number of features and the norm of the inverse feature differ-
ence matrix (as introduced later).
Third, we analyze the planning problem of finding the op-
timal deception strategy once the attacker’s preferences are
learned. We show that the problem is NP-hard in general and
propose an approximation algorithm.
Finally, we perform extensive experiments to validate our
results. We demonstrate that we can learn the attacker’s be-
havior model using a modest amount of data. Our planning
algorithm can solve FDGs with 200 targets in 1 minute. Our
combined learning and planning framework can find a decep-
tion strategy that is almost as good as the optimal strategy had
we known the attacker’s true preferences.
2 The Model
In an FDG, a defender aims to protect a set N of n targets
from an adversary. Each target i ∈ N has a set M of m fea-
tures which the defender can strategically manipulate. The
adversary observes these features and then chooses a target to
attack. The defender incurs a loss ui ∈ [−1, 1] if the adver-
sary chooses to attack target i.1 The defender’s objective is to
minimize her expected loss.
Features Features are the key element of the FDG model.
Each feature has an observable value and a hidden value. The
hidden value is fixed, while the defender controls the observ-
able value. Only the observable values are visible to the ad-
versary. This ties into the notion of deception, where one may
think of the hidden value as representing the ‘ground truth,’
whereas the observable value is what the defender would like
the attacker to see. Table 1 shows an example of the observ-
able and hidden values of different features in cybersecurity.
Deception means that the defender manipulates the at-
tacker’s perceived value of a target, not the actual value.
Thus, changing the observable values does not affect the de-
fender’s loss ui at each target.
Feature representation We represent the observable fea-
ture values of target i by a vector xi = (xik)k∈M ∈ [0, 1]m.
We denote their corresponding hidden values as xˆi ∈ [0, 1]m.
We allow for both continuous and discrete features. In prac-
tice, we may have categorical features, such as the type of
operating system, and they can be represented using one-hot
encoding with binary features.
Feasibility constraints For a feature k with hidden value
xˆik, the defender can set its observable value xik ∈ A(xˆik) ⊆
[0, 1], where the feasible set A(xˆik) is determined by the hid-
den value. In the sequel, for continuous features, we assume
A(xˆik) takes the form [xˆik − τik, xˆik + τik] ∩ [0, 1]. This
1Typically, the loss ui is non-negative, but it might be negative if,
for example, the target is set up as a decoy or honeypot, and allows
the defender to gain information about the attacker.
captures the feasibility constraint in setting up the observ-
able value of a feature based on its hidden value. For binary
features, A(xˆik) ⊆ {0, 1}. In addition to these feasibility
constraints for individual features, we also allow for linear
constraints over multiple features, which could encode natu-
ral constraints for categorical features with one-hot encoding,
e.g.
∑
k xik = 1. They may also encode the realistic consid-
erations when setting up the observable features. For exam-
ple, xik1 +xik2 ≤ 1 could mean that a Linux machine cannot
possibly have ActiveX available.
Budget constraint Deception comes at a cost. We as-
sume the cost is additive across targets and features: c =∑
i∈N
∑
k∈M cik, where cik = ηik|xik − xˆik|. For a contin-
uous feature k, ηik represents the cost associated with unit of
change from the hidden value to the observable value. If k is
binary, ηik defines the cost of switching states. The defender
has a budget B to cover these costs.
Defender strategies The defender’s strategy is an observ-
able feature configuration x = {xi}i∈N . We assume the de-
fender uses only pure strategies. We discuss the relaxation of
this assumption in Section 7.
Attacker strategies The attacker’s pure strategy is to
choose a target i ∈ N to attack. Since human behavior is
not perfectly rational, we reason about the adversary using
a general class of bounded rationality models. We assume
the attacker’s utilities are characterized by a score function
f : [0, 1]m → R>0 over the observable features of a target.
Given the observable feature configuration x = {xi}i∈N , he
attacks target i with probability f(xi)/
∑
j∈N f(xj). We as-
sume that f is parameterized by θ, and takes the form of vari-
ous function classes, e.g., a neural network. Given the strong
expressive power of neural networks, such model can approx-
imate a large class of actual behavioral models of the attacker.
The ultimate goal of the defender is to find the optimal fea-
ture configuration against an unknown attacker. This may be
decomposed into two subtasks. First, she learns the attacker’s
behavior model from attack data (learning). Then, she ma-
nipulates the feature configuration to minimize her expected
loss (planning), based on the learned attacker’s preferences.
In the following sections, we first analyze the sample com-
plexity of the learning task and then propose algorithms for
the planning task.
3 Learning the Adversary’s Preferences
The defender attempts to learn the adversary’s score function
f from a set D of d labeled data points. The jth data point
is denoted as (N j , xj , yj). N j is the set of targets in this ex-
ample, and xj is the observable feature configuration of each
target in N j . The label yj ∈ N j indicates that the adversary
chooses target yj to attack.
A general approach for learning the score function f , pa-
rameterized by θ, is by maximum-likelihood estimation, i.e.,
θ = arg max
θ′
∑
j
[
Ljθ′(N
j , xj , yj)
]
,
where
Ljθ′(N
j , xj , yj) = log(fθ′(x
j
yj ))− log(
∑
i∈Nj
fθ′(x
j
i )).
Assuming fθ is Lipschitz and differentiable in θ, we can
apply any gradient-based optimizer, e.g. RMSProp [Hinton
et al., 2012], to solve the optimization problem for θ. This
approach can be applied to general score functions, though it
is not guaranteed to find the optimal solution given the non-
convexity of L.
To analyze the sample complexity of learning the adver-
sary’s preferences, we now proceed with a different learning
algorithm and a special form of score function f — a one-
layer neural network followed by an exponential function, pa-
rameterized by θ = w = (w1, . . . , wm).
f(xi) = exp
(∑
k∈M
wkxik
)
(1)
We show that, in an FDG withm features, the defender can
learn the attacker’s behavior model correctly with high prob-
ability, using only m observable feature configurations and a
polynomial number of samples. We view this condition as
very mild, because even if the network administrator’s histor-
ical dataset does not meet the requirement, she could set up
a honeynet to elicit attacks, where she can control the feature
configurations at each target [Spitzner, 2003].
Haghtalab et al. [2016] studied a closely related prob-
lem on the sample complexity in Stackelberg security games.
However, their techniques cannot be directly applied, as in
security games the coverage probability is the only “feature”
that the defender controls, while in FDG there could be an ar-
bitrary number of features. We leverage the high-level idea
in [Haghtalab et al., 2016], and introduce the inverse fea-
ture difference matrix (Ast)−1. Specifically, given observ-
able feature configurations x1, . . . , xm, for any two targets
s, t ∈ N , let Ast be the m ×m matrix whose (i, j)-entry is
astij = x
i
sj − xitj . Ast captures the matrix-level correlation
among different feature configurations. We use the matrix
norm of (Ast)−1 to bound the learning error. In doing so,
we also eliminate the technical conditions they imposed on
defender strategies. Our result is formally stated as the fol-
lowing theorem; its proof is deferred to Appendix B.1.
Theorem 3.1. Considerm observable feature configurations
x1, x2, . . . , xm ∈ [0, 1]mn. Let α = mins6=t ||(Ast)−1||,
where || · || is the matrix norm induced by the L1 vector norm,
i.e. ||(Ast)−1|| = supy 6=0 |(A
st)−1y|
|y| . With Ω(
α4m4
ρ2 log
nm
δ )
samples for each of the m feature configurations, with proba-
bility 1− δ, we can uniformly learn f(·) within multiplicative
error .
Proof sketch. For feature configuration x, let Dx(t) =
f(xt)∑
i∈N f(xi)
be the attack probability on target t, and assume
Dx(t) > ρ for all x and t. Construct a system of m equations
Astw = bst, where bst = (ln D
x1 (s)
Dx1 (t)
, . . . , ln D
xm (s)
Dxm (t)
). To find
w, we solve the equations Astwˆ = bˆst, where bˆst is based on
empirical distributions Dˆx(·). Using a concentration argu-
ment, we can bound the difference |bˆst − bst|. With the norm
of (Ast)−1, we can then bound the difference |wˆ − w|.
The α in the theorem above need not be large. Consider a
sequence of m feature configurations x1, . . . , xm, and focus
on targets 1 and 2. For each xj , let the features on target
1 be identical to target 2, except for the j-th feature, where
xj1j = 1 and x
j
2j = 0. This leads toA
12 = I , and thus α ≤ 1.
This is compatible with the binary encoding of categorical
features, if we represent the default category as all 0’s.
When the score function f is approximately learned, the
optimal feature configuration assuming the learned score
function fˆ is also near optimal against the true score func-
tion f . Let Uˆ(x) =
∑
i∈N fˆ(xi)ui∑
j∈N fˆ(xj)
be the defender’s expected
loss using feature configuration x assuming fˆ . Define U(x)
as the corresponding defender’s utility assuming f . We can
adapt Theorem 3.7 of Haghtalab et al. [2016] to obtain the
following result, whose proof is included in Appendix B.2.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose that for some  ≤ 1/4, 11+ <
fˆ(xi)/f(xi) < 1 +  for all xi . Then, |Uˆ(x) − U(x)| ≤ 4
for all x. Furthermore, let x′ = arg maxx Uˆ(x) and x∗ =
arg maxx U(x), then U(x∗)− U(x′) ≤ 8.
4 Computing the Optimal Feature
Configuration
We now embark on our second task: assuming the (learned)
adversary’s behavior model, compute the optimal observable
feature configuration to minimize the defender’s expected
loss. This can be formulated as an optimization problem.
min
x
∑
i∈N f(xi)ui∑
i∈N f(xi)
s.t.
∑
i∈N
∑
k∈M
ηik|xik − xˆik| ≤ B
Categorical feature constraints
xik ∈ A(xˆik) ∀i ∈ N, k ∈M
In general, this optimization problem is typically non-convex,
and very difficult to solve. We show that the decision version
of FDG is NP-complete, hence finding the optimal feature
configuration is NP-hard. In fact, this holds even when there
is only a single binary feature and the score function f takes
the form in Eq. (1).
Theorem 4.1. FDG is NP-complete.
Proof. We reduce from the Knapsack problem. Given v ∈
[0, 1]n, ω ∈ Rn+,Ω, V ∈ R+, decide whether there exists
y ∈ {0, 1}n such that∑ni=1 viyi ≥ V and∑ni=1 ωiyi ≤ Ω.
We construct an instance of FDG. Let the set of targets
be N = {1, . . . , n + 1}, and let there be a single binary
feature, i.e. M = {1} and xi1 ∈ {0, 1} for each i ∈ N .
Since there is only one feature, we abuse the notation by using
xi = xi1. Suppose each target’s hidden value of the feature
is xˆi = 0. Consider a score function f such that f(0) = 1
and f(1) = 2. For each i ∈ N , let ui = 1−viδ if i 6= n + 1,
and un+1 =
1+V+
∑n
i=1 vi
δ . We chose a large enough δ ≥ 1
such that un+1 ≤ 1. In addition, for each i ∈ N , let ηi = ωi
if i 6= n+ 1, and ηn+1 = 0. Finally, let the budget B = Ω.
For a solution y to each Knapsack instance, we construct a
solution x to the above FDG where xi = yi for i 6= n+1, and
xn+1 = 0. First, we know
∑
i∈N ηi|xi−xˆi| =
∑
i∈N ηixi ≤
B if and only if
∑n
i=1 ωiyi ≤ Ω. Since f(xi) > 0 for all xi,∑
i∈N f(xi)ui∑
i∈N f(xi)
≤ 1/δ if and only if∑i∈N (1− δui)f(xi) ≥ 0.
Note that
∑
i∈N (1−δui) =
∑n
i=1 vi(yi+1)−
∑n
i=1 vi−V .
Thus, y is a certificate of Knapsack if and only if x is feasible
for FDG and the defender’s expected loss is at most 1/δ.
We present an approximation algorithm based on mixed
integer linear programming (MILP). Given f(xi) =
exp(
∑
k∈M wkxik), scaling the score by a factor of e
−W
does not affect the attack probability, where W = |w| is the
L1 norm of w = (w1, . . . , wm). Thus, we treat the score
function as f(xi) = exp(
∑
k∈M wkxik −W ).
Let zi =
∑
k∈M wkxik −W ∈ [−2W, 0]. We divide the
interval [−2W, 0] into 2W/ subintervals, each of length .
On interval [−l,−(l− 1)] with l = 0, 1, . . . , 2W/, we ap-
proximate the function ezi with the line segment of slope γl
connecting the points (−l, e−l) and (−(l − 1), e−(l−1)).
We use this method to approximate the score of each tar-
get, fi, in the following mathematical program. We represent
zi = −
∑
l zil, where each variable zil indicates the quantity
zi takes up on the interval [−l,−(l − 1)]. The constraints
in Eq. (6)-(7) ensure that zi(l+1) > 0 only if zil = . While
the formulation presented in Eq. (2)-(9) is not technically a
MILP, we can linearize the objective and the constraint in-
volving absolute value, but avoid doing so here for clarity.
The MILP formulation is relegated to Appendix A.
min
f,z,x,y
∑
i fiui∑
i fi
(2)
s.t. fi = e
−2W +
∑
l
γl(− zil) ∀i ∈ N (3)∑
k∈M
wkxik −W = −
∑
l
zil ∀i ∈ N (4)∑
i,k
ηik|xik − xˆik| ≤ B (5)
yil ≤ zil, zi(l+1) ≤ yil ∀l,∀i ∈ N (6)
zil ∈ [0, ], yil ∈ {0, 1} ∀l,∀i ∈ N (7)
Categorical constraints (8)
xik ∈ A(xˆik) ∀i ∈ N, k ∈M (9)
We can now establish the following bound, whose proof
appears in Appendix B.3.
Theorem 4.2. Given  < 1, The MILP above is a 22-
approximation to the original problem.
Proof sketch. We first need to analyze the tightness of the lin-
ear approximation. Using inequalities e ≤ 2 +  + 1 for
 < 1.7 and ve1/v−1 ≤ 1 + (v − 1)2/2 for v ≥ 1, we can
uniformly bound the approximation error fˆ(xi)−f(xi)f(xi) ≤ 
2
2 .
This allows us to bound the difference between true and ap-
proximated defender’s expected utility on any feature config-
uration by |Uˆ(x)−U(x)| ≤ 2. We use the triangle inequality
to connect the approximate solution and the true solution.
While the mathematical program in Eq. (2)-(9) could be
transformed into a MILP, the necessary linearization intro-
duces many additional variables, increasing the size of the
problem. To improve scalability, we perform binary search
on the objective value δ. Specifically, the objective at each
iteration of binary search becomes
min
f,z,x,y
∑
i
fiui − δ
∑
i
fi. (10)
The complete procedure is given as Alg. 1 in Appendix A.
With the objective in Eq. (10), we no longer need to perform
linearization to obtain a MILP. This leads to significant per-
formance improvement as we show later in the experiments.
We also preserve the approximation bound; the proof appears
in Appendix B.4.
Theorem 4.3. Given  < 1 and tolerance bs, binary search
gives a (22 + bs)-approximation.
In addition, we propose two exact algorithms for special
cases of FDG, which can be found in Appendix C. When the
deception cost is associated with discrete features only, we
provide an exact MILP formulation. When there is no budget
and feasibility constraints, we can find the optimal defender
strategy in O(n log n+m) time.
5 Experiments
We present the experimental results for our learning and plan-
ning algorithms separately, and then combine them to demon-
strate the effectiveness of our learning and planning frame-
work. All experiments are carried out on a 3.8GHz Intel Core
i5 CPU with 32GB RAM. We use RMSProp as our gradient-
based optimizer, Ipopt as our non-convex solver, and CPLEX
12.8 as the MILP solver. All results are averaged over 20
instances; error bars represent the standard deviations.
5.1 Learning
Simple score function First, we assume the adversary uses
the score function specified in Eq (1). The defender learns
this score function using either the closed-form estimation
(CF) in Theorem 3.1, or a gradient-based algorithm (GD).
We study how the learning accuracy changes with the size
of training sample d. We sample the parameters of the true
score function f uniformly at random from [−0.5, 0.5]. We
then generate m feature configurations uniformly at random.
For each of them, we sample the attacked target d/m times
according to f , obtaining a training set of d samples. We also
generate a test set D˜ of 5×105 feature configurations sampled
uniformly at random. We measure the learning error as the
mean total variation distance between the attack distribution
from the learned model fˆ and that of the true model f :
1
|D˜|
|D˜|∑
j=1
dTV
((
f(xji )∑
t∈N f(x
j
t )
)
i∈N
,
(
fˆ(xji )∑
t∈N fˆ(x
j
t )
)
i∈N
)
.
Figure 1a shows that for both learning approaches, the learn-
ing error decreases as we increase the number of samples. In
general, GD outperforms CF. This is expected as the size of
the training dataset is far smaller than that implied by Theo-
rem 3.1. The learning error increases for both methods when
we have more features, and for CF, more targets as well.
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Figure 1: Experimental results
Complex score function We assume the adversary uses a
3-layer neural network score function, whose details are in
Appendix E. Since CF is no longer applicable, for each sam-
ple size d, we generate d feature configurations and sample
an attacked target for each of them in the training set. Fig. 1b
shows GD can minimize the learning error to below 0.15.
We also measured |θˆ−θ|, the L1 error in the score function
parameter θ, which directly relates to the sample complexity
bound in Theorem 3.1. We include the results in Appendix D.
5.2 Planning
We test our algorithms on finding the optimal feature config-
uration against a known attacker model. The FDG parameter
distributions are included in Appendix E. Experiments on our
special case algorithms are included in Appendix D.
Simple score function Fig. 1c shows that the MILP in
Eq (2)-(9) becomes impractical to test when n ≥ 50, whereas
the binary search extension (MILPBS) scales up to problems
with 200 targets. We note that this is already at the scale of
many real-world problems. Fig. 1d shows that MILPBS also
scales better on the number of features. We set the MILP’s
error bound at 0.005; the difference in the two algorithms’
results is negligible.
Complex score function When the features are continu-
ous without feasibility constraints, planning becomes a non-
convex optimization problem. We can apply the gradient-
based optimizer or non-convex solver. We also introduce a
greedy heuristic inspired by the special case algorithm in Ap-
pendix C.2. GREEDY (Alg. 2 in Appendix A) finds the feature
vectors that maximize and minimize the score, respectively,
by GD. It then greedily applies these features to targets of
extreme losses. Recall that U(x) is the defender’s expected
loss using feature configuration x. We measure the solution
gap of alg ∈ {Ipopt, GD, GREEDY} as U(xalg)−U(xGD)
U(xGD)
, where
xalg is the solution from alg. We choose GD as baseline as it
typically yields the best solution.
Fig. 1e–1h show the running time and solution gap fixing
either m = 12 or n = 10. GD does well in both dimen-
sions. GREEDY lags in solution quality, while non-convex
solver struggles in both. However, these algorithms do not
provide any solution guarantees, thus we cannot conclude that
any of them (including GD) yields a good defender strategy.
5.3 Combining Learning and Planning
We integrate the learning and planning algorithms to exam-
ine our full framework. The defender learns a score function
fˆ using algorithm L. Then, she uses planning algorithm P to
find an optimal configuration xL,P assuming fˆ . We measure
the solution gap as U(x
L,P)−U(x∗)
U(x∗) , where x
∗ is the optimal
feature configuration against the true attacker model, com-
puted using MILPBS or GD. We choose them as baselines as
they have better solution quality in the previous experiments.
Simple score function We test learning algorithms L ∈
{CF, GD} and planning algorithms P ∈ {MILP, MILPBS}.
As shown in Fig. 1i, more training data lead to smaller solu-
tion gaps. Consistently with the results in Fig. 1a, GD learn-
ing has better performance. Consistently with the planning
results, the difference between MILP and MILPBS in solu-
tion quality is negligible. With n ≤ 20 targets, all algorithms
yield solution gaps below 0.1 (Fig. 1j). With n ≥ 50, CF
learning shows unsatisfactory results. Compared to Fig. 1a,
we have more targets, which increases the sample complexity.
GD learning performs well on all problem sizes.
Complex score function We test learning algorithm GD
and planning algorithms P ∈ {GD, Ipopt, GREEDY}. Fig. 1k
shows that all algorithms benefit from having more training
data, and GD performs the best. Compared to the case with 1-
layer score functions, more data are required here to achieve
a small solution gap. Since we have small learning error for
both cases (Fig. 1a,1b), this suggests planning is more sensi-
tive to complex score functions than simple score functions.
When given enough data, Fig. 1l shows that GD can achieve
a solution gap below 0.2 with as many as 50 targets.
6 Related Work
Deception as a game Deception has been studied in many
domains, and of immediate relevance is its use in cybersecu-
rity [Rowe, 2007]. Studies have suggested that deceptively
responding to an attacker’s scanning and probing could be
a useful defensive measure [Jajodia et al., 2017; Albanese et
al., 2016]. Schlenker et al. [2018] and Wang and Zeng [2018]
propose game-theoretic models where the defender strategi-
cally manipulates the query response to a known attacker. In
addition to proposing a domain-independent model, we ad-
vance the state of the art by (1) providing a unified learning
and planning framework with theoretical guarantee which can
deal with unknown attackers, (2) extending the finite “type”
space in both papers, where “type” is defined by the combina-
tion of feature values, to an infinite feature space that allows
for both continuous and discrete features, and (3) incorporat-
ing a highly expressive bounded rationality model whereas
both papers assume perfectly rational attackers.
On the game-theoretic modeling of deception in gen-
eral, Hora´k et al. [2017] study a defender that engages an
attacker in a sequential interaction. Nguyen et al. [2019] of-
fer a complementary view where the attacker aims at deceiv-
ing the defender. In [Yin et al., 2014; Guo et al., 2017;
Nguyen et al., 2019] deception is defined as deceptively allo-
cating defensive resources. We study feature deception where
no effective tools can thwart an attack, which is arguably
more realistic in high-stakes interactions. When such tools
exist, feature deception is still valuable for strategic defense.
Learning in Stackelberg games Much work has also been
devoted to learning in Stackelberg games. Our work is most
directly related to that of Haghtalab et al. [2016]. They con-
sider an SUQR adversary behavior model, and provide a sim-
ilar learning guarantee as our Theorem 3.1. The only deci-
sion variable in their model, the coverage probability, may be
viewed as a single feature in FDG. FDG allows for an arbi-
trary number of features, and this realistic extension makes
their key technique inapplicable. Our main learning result
also removes the technical constraints on defender strate-
gies present in their work. Sinha et al. [2016] study learn-
ing adversary’s preferences in a probably approximately cor-
rect (PAC) setting. However, their learning accuracy depends
heavily on the quality of distribution from which they sample
the defender’s strategies. We provide a uniform guarantee in
a distribution-free context. Other papers [Blum et al., 2014;
Marecki et al., 2012; Letchford et al., 2009; Peng et al., 2019]
study the online learning setting with rational attackers. As
pointed out by Haghtalab et al. [2016], considering the more
realistic bounded rationality scenario allows us to make use of
historical data and use our algorithm more easily in practice.
Planning with boundedly rational attackers Yang et
al. [2012] propose a MILP-based solution similar to our ap-
proximation algorithm. We generalize the coverage probabil-
ity to features, and adopt a more expressive behavior model.
The subsequent papers that incorporate learning with such
bounded rationality models do not provide any theoretical
guarantee [Yang et al., 2014; Fang et al., 2015]. In these
papers, manipulating coverage probabilities affects the de-
fender’s utility. This is not the case in FDG due to the very
notion of deception. However, this does not make our model
technically easier to analyze in any substantial way.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
We conclude with a few remarks regarding the generality and
limitations of our work. First, our model allows for more so-
phisticated attackers who can outstrip deception. A singleton
feasible setA(xˆik) could indicate that the defender knows the
attacker is able to find out the hidden value of a feature.
Second, we assumed the hidden feature values are fixed,
as they often represent environmental parameters beyond the
defender’s control, or at least present high cost of manipu-
lation. Altering them also does not align conceptually with
deception. As a result, we treat defender’s losses ui as fixed.
Third, we assumed the defender uses only pure strategies.
In many domains such as cybersecurity, it is often too costly
to frequently perform system reconfiguration. Thus, the sys-
tem appears to the attacker as static. We leave to future work
to explore the additional strength of mixed strategies in appli-
cations where they are appropriate.
Finally, it would be interesting to consider the attacker’s
ability to recognize deception after repeated interactions.
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Appendix:
Learning and Planning in
Feature Deception Games
A Deferred Algorithms
We show the MILP formulation for the mathematical pro-
gram in Eq. (2)- (9). We use Mc ⊆ M to denote
the set of continuous features, and Md = M − Mc
denotes the set of discrete features. For discrete fea-
ture k ∈ Md, we assume that ηik and budget B have
been processed such that Constraint (5) has been modified
to
∑
i∈N
(∑
k∈Mc ηik|xik − xˆik|+
∑
k∈Md ηikxik
) ≤ B.
This transformation based on xˆik ∈ {0, 1} simplifies our pre-
sentation below.
max
b,d,g,h,q,s,t,v,y
∑
i∈N
ti (11)
s.t. ti = ve
−2W +
∑
l
γl(v− sil) (12)∑
k∈Mc
wkqik +
∑
k∈Md
wkbik −Wv = −
∑
l
sil (13)
hik ≥ qik − xˆikv, hik ≥ xˆikv − qik ∀k ∈Mc (14)∑
i∈N
( ∑
k∈Md
ηikbik +
∑
k∈Mc
ηikhik
)
≤ Bv (15)
gil ≤ sil, si(l+1) ≤ gil ∀l (16)
sil ≤ v ∀l (17)
gil ≤ v, gil ≤ Zyil, gil ≥ v − Z(1− yil) ∀l (18)
bik ≤ v, bik ≤ Zdik, bil ≥ v − Z(1− dik) ∀k ∈Md (19)
qik ∈ [(xˆik − τik)v, (xˆik + τik)v] ∩ [0, 1] ∀k ∈Mc (20)∑
i∈N
uiti = 1 (21)
Categorical constraints (22)
ti, v, sil, qik, hik, gil ≥ 0, yil ∈ {0, 1} ∀k ∈Mc,∀l (23)
bik ≥ 0, dik ∈ {0, 1} ∀k ∈Md (24)
We establish the variables in the MILP above with the FDG
variables as below.
ti =
fi∑
i∈N fiui
, v =
1∑
i∈N fiui
(25)
hik =
|xik − xˆik|∑
i∈N fiui
, qik =
xik∑
i∈N fiui
, ∀k ∈Mc (26)
dik = xik, bik =
xik∑
i∈N fiui
, ∀k ∈Md (27)
sil =
zil∑
i∈N fiui
, gil =
yil∑
i∈N fiui
, ∀l (28)
(29)
All equations above involving index i without summation
should be interpreted as applying to all i ∈ N .
Algorithm 1: MILP-BS
1 Initialize L = −1, U = 1, δ = 0, bs
2 while U − L > bs do
3 Solve the MILP in Eq. (2)-(9) with objective in
Eq. (10).
4 if objective value < 0 then
5 Let U = δ
6 else
7 Let L = δ
8 return U , the MILP solution when U was last updated
Algorithm 2: GREEDY
1 Use gradient-based method to find
xmax ≈ arg maxx f(x) and xmin ≈ arg minx f(x).
2 Sort the targets such that u1 ≤ u2 ≤ · · · ≤ un.
3 Initialize i = 1, j = n.
4 while i < j and budget > 0 do
5 Let xi ← xmax if
6 if Cost(xi ← xmax) ≤ remaining budget then
7 xi ← xmax, decrease the budget, i = i+ 1.
8 if Cost(xj ← xmin) ≤ remaining budget then
9 xj ← xmin, decrease the budget, j = j − 1.
10 return feature configuration x
B Deferred Proofs
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We require the following lemma.
Lemma B.1. [Haghtalab et al., 2016] Given observable fea-
tures x ∈ [0, 1]mn, and Ω( 1ρ2 log nδ ) samples, we have
1
1+ ≤ Dˆ
x(t)
Dx(t) ≤ 1 +  with probability 1− δ, for all t ∈ N .
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Fix , δ > 0. Fix two nodes s 6= t.
For each xi where i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, we have
m∑
j=1
wj(x
i
sj − xitj) = ln
Dx
i
(s)
Dxi(t)
Let
bst = (ln
Dx
1
(s)
Dx1(t)
, . . . , ln
Dx
m
(s)
Dxm(t)
).
The system of equations above can be represented byAstw =
bst. Let || · || be the matrix norm induced by L1 vector norm,
that is,
||Ast|| = sup
x 6=0
|Astx|
|x| , where |x| =
m∑
j=1
|xj |.
It is known that ||Ast|| = max1≤j≤m
∑m
i=1 |astij |. In our
case, the feature values are bounded in [0, 1] and thus |astij | ≤
1. This yields ||Ast|| ≤ m. Now, choose s, t such that
||(Ast)−1|| = α. Suppose Ast is invertible.
Let ′ = 4α2m2 and δ
′ = δm . Suppose we have
Ω( 1ρ′2 log
n
δ′ ) samples. From Lemma B.1, for any node r ∈
N and any feature configuration xi where i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
1
1+′ ≤ Dˆ
xi (r)
Dxi (r)
≤ 1 + ′ with probability 1 − δ′. The
bound holds for all strategies simultaneously with probabil-
ity at least 1 −mδ′ = 1− δ, using a union bound argument.
In particular, for our chosen nodes s and t, we have
1
(1 + ′)2
≤ Dˆ
xi(s)
Dˆxi(t)
Dx
i
(t)
Dxi(s)
≤ (1 + ′)2, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m
Define bˆst similarly as bst but using empirical distribution
Dˆ instead of true distribution D. Let e = bˆst − bst. Then, for
each i = 1, . . . ,m, we have
−2′ ≤ 2 ln 1
1 + ′
≤ ei = ln Dˆ
xi(s)Dx
i
(t)
Dˆxi(t)Dxi(s)
≤ 2 ln(1+′) ≤ 2′
Therefore, we have |e| ≤ 2′m. Let wˆ be such that Astwˆ =
bˆst, i.e. wˆ − w = (Ast)−1e. Observe that
|(Ast)−1e|/|(Ast)−1bst|
|e|/|bst| ≤ maxe˜,b˜st 6=0
|(Ast)−1e˜|/|(Ast)−1b˜st|
|e˜|/|b˜st|
= max
e˜ 6=0
|(Ast)−1e˜|
|e˜| maxb˜st 6=0
|b˜st|
|(Ast)−1b˜st|
= max
e˜ 6=0
|(Ast)−1e˜|
|e˜| maxy 6=0
|Asty|
|y|
= ||(Ast)−1|| · ||Ast||
This leads to
|(Ast)−1e| ≤ ||(Ast)−1|| · ||Ast|| · |e| · |(A
st)−1bst|
|bst|
≤ ||(Ast)−1|| · ||Ast|| · |e| · max
b˜st 6=0
|(Ast)−1b˜st|
|b˜st|
= ||(Ast)−1||2 · ||Ast|| · |e|
≤ α2m(2′m)
For any observable feature configuration x,∣∣∣∣∣∣
 m∑
j=1
wjxij
−
 m∑
j=1
wˆjxij
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
m∑
j=1
|wˆj − wj |
= |(Ast)−1e| ≤ α2m(2′m) = 
2
Therefore,
1
1 + 
≤ f(xi)
fˆ(xi)
≤ 1 + 
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof. Let fˆ(xi) = exp(
∑
k wˆkxik) and f(xi) =
exp(
∑
k wkxik). Since
1
1 + 
<
fˆ(xi)
f(xi)
< 1 + ,
we get
− ≤ − ln(1+) <
∑
k
(wˆk−wk)xik = ln fˆ(xi)
f(xi)
< ln(1+) ≤ .
That is, |∑k(wˆk − wk)xik| < . The proof of Theorem 3.7
in [Haghtalab et al., 2016] now follows if we redefine their
ui(pi) as
∑
k∈M wkxik and uˆi(pi) as
∑
k∈M wˆkxik. For
completeness, we adapt their proof below using our notations.
Let D¯x(t) = fˆ(xt)∑
i fˆ(xi)
. Then, we have
∣∣∣∣ln D¯x(t)Dx(t)
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
(∑
k
(wˆk − wk)xtk
)
− ln
∑
i exp{
∑
k wˆkxik}∑
i exp{
∑
k wkxik}
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∑
k
(wˆk − wk)xtk
∣∣∣∣∣+∣∣∣∣ln ∑i exp{∑k wkxik} exp{∑k(wˆk − wk)xik}∑
i exp{
∑
k wkxik}
∣∣∣∣
< + max
i
∣∣∣∣∣ln exp{∑
k
(wˆk − wk)xik}
∣∣∣∣∣
< 2
Using a few inequalities we can bound
∣∣∣ D¯x(t)Dx(t) − 1∣∣∣ ≤ 4.
Finally,
|Uˆ(x)− U(x)| =
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈N
(D¯x(i)−Dx(i))ui
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
i∈N
∣∣D¯x(i)−Dx(i)∣∣ |ui|
=
∑
i∈N
∣∣∣∣D¯x(i)Dx(i) − 1
∣∣∣∣ |ui|Dx(i)
≤ 4
∑
i∈N
|ui|Dx(i)
≤ 4max
i∈N
|ui|
≤ 4
Let x∗ = arg minx U(x) be the true optimal feature con-
figuration and x′ = arg minx Uˆ(x) be the optimal config-
uration using the learned score function fˆ . Thus, we have
U(x′) ≤ Uˆ(x′) + 4 ≤ Uˆ(x∗) + 4 ≤ U(x∗) + 8.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 4.2
To analyze the approximation bound of this MILP, we first
need to analyze the tightness of the linear approximation.
Consider two points s1, s2 where s2 − s1 = . The line
segment is t(s) = 1 (e
s2 − es1)s − 1 (es2 − es1)s1 + es1 .
Let ∆(s) be the ratio between the line and es on the interval
[s1, s2]. It is easy to find that ∆(s) is maximized at
s∗ = 1 + s1 − 
e − 1 ,
with
∆(s∗) =
e−1

exp{1− e−1}
.
Now, let v = e
−1
 . It is known that v ∈ [1, 1 + ] when
 < 1.7. Note that δ(x∗) = v exp{ 1v − 1} ≤ 1 + (v −
1)2/2, which holds for all v ≥ 1. Let fˆ(·) be the piecewise
linear approximation. For any target i and observable feature
configuration xi, we have
fˆ(xi)
f(xi)
≤ v ≤ 1 + 
2
2
.
Let x∗ be the optimal observable features against the true
score function f , and let x′ be the optimal observable features
to the above MILP. Let U(·) be the defender’s expected loss,
and Uˆ(·) be the approximate defender’s expected loss. For
any observable feature configuration x, we have
|Uˆ(x)− U(x)| =
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i fˆ(xi)ui∑
i fˆ(xi)
−
∑
i f(xi)ui∑
i f(xi)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i fˆ(xi)ui∑
i fˆ(xi)
−
∑
i fˆ(xi)ui∑
i f(xi)
+
∑
i fˆ(xi)ui∑
i f(xi)
−
∑
i f(xi)ui∑
i f(xi)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 2∑
i f(xi)
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
f(xi)−
∑
i
fˆ(xi)
∣∣∣∣∣ = 2
(∑
i fˆ(xi)∑
i f(xi)
− 1
)
≤ 2
Therefore, we obtain
U(x′)− U(x∗) = U(x′)− Uˆ(x′) + Uˆ(x′)− U(x∗)
≤ U(x′)− Uˆ(x′) + Uˆ(x∗)− U(x∗)
≤ 22
B.4 Proof of Theorem 4.3
Suppose binary search terminates with interval of length
U − L ≤ bs, and observable features xbs. Both xbs and
the optimal observable features x′ to the MILP lie in this in-
terval. This means Uˆ(xbs)−Uˆ(xˆ) ≤ bs. Recall that x∗ is the
optimal observable features against the true score function f .
Therefore, we have
U(xbs)− U(x∗) = U(xbs)− Uˆ(xbs) + Uˆ(xbs)− U(x∗)
≤ U(xbs)− Uˆ(xbs) + Uˆ(xˆ) + bs − U(x∗)
≤ U(xbs)− Uˆ(xbs) + Uˆ(x∗) + bs − U(x∗)
≤ 22 + bs
C Exact Algorithms for Special Cases
C.1 Deception cost on discrete features
In our first attempt at exact algorithms, we assume the cost of
deception is only associated with discrete features, i.e. ηik =
0 if k is a continuous feature.
Recall that we use Mc ⊆ M to denote the set of continu-
ous features, and Md = M −Mc denotes the set of discrete
features. Suppose xdi = (xik)k∈Md and x
c
i = (xik)k∈Mc ,
and let xi = (xdi , x
c
i ) be the observable features decomposed
into discrete features and continuous features. Our score
function f(xi) = exp{
∑
k∈M wkxik} can be factorized into
f(xi) = fd(x
d
i )fc(x
c
i ), where fd, fc are scores considering
discrete and continuous features only, respectively.
Let Adi = {xdji : j = 1, . . . , k} be the finite set of
possible discrete observable feature combinations at target
i. Each xdji ∈ {0, 1}md is a md-dimensional vector, where
md = |Md| is the number of discrete features in FDG.
Based on the hidden discrete features xˆdi and the feasible
regions A(xˆik), we can compute both Adi and all possible
scores fdij = fd(x
dj
i ). Similarly, we can compute the interval
[αi, βi] in which the continuous score f ci could possibly lie,
since each continuous feature xik can take value in an interval
A(xˆik).
Subsequently, we formulate the following mathematical
program. The binary variable yij = 1 if target i’s discrete
observable features are the j-th combination in Adi , that is,
xdi = x
dj
i ∈ Adi . The cost cij for setting the discrete observ-
able features to xdji could be computed accordingly.
min
y,fc
∑
i∈N
∑k
j=1 uif
d
ijyijf
c
i∑
i∈N
∑k
j=1 f
d
ijyijf
c
i
s.t.
k∑
j=1
yij = 1 ∀i ∈ N
∑
i∈N
k∑
j=1
cijyij ≤ B
f ci ∈ [αi, βi] ∀i ∈ N
yij ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ N, j ∈ [k]
We may apply the same linearization method as before to ob-
tain a MILP.
Solving this MILP yields the optimal discrete feature con-
figuration, as well as the optimal scores f ci ’s of the continuous
features. One may then solve the system of linear equations
ln f ci =
∑
k∈M wkxik for i ∈ N for the optimal continuous
features. Since the feasible regions of the continuous features
are connected, there exists at least one solution to the system
of equations. We remark that when all features are continu-
ous, the above approach finds the optimal feature configura-
tion in polynomial time.
C.2 No budget and feasibility constraints
We present an efficient algorithm when the defender has no
budget and feasibility constraints. [Schlenker et al., 2018]
proposed a greedy algorithm in a similar setting (with feasi-
bility constraints), whose complexity is polynomial in the size
of “type space”, which is still exponential in the representa-
tion of FDG, not to mention that with a single continuous
feature the size of our “type space” becomes infinite. Fur-
thermore, the probabilistic behavior of the attacker in FDG
makes their key strategy inapplicable.
Since the defender aims at minimizing her expected loss,
one intuitive idea is to give the lowest score to the target with
the highest loss ui. In fact, we show below that the defender
should configure the features at each target in only two possi-
ble ways: the ones which maximizes or minimizes the score.
First, we assume that the defender’s losses have been sorted
in ascending order u1 ≤ u2 ≤ · · · ≤ un.
Lemma C.1. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) be an optimal observable
feature configuration. There exists a permutation σ on N
where xσ = (xσ(1), . . . , xσ(n)) is also an optimal observable
feature configuration, and
f(xσ(1)) ≥ f(xσ(2)) ≥ · · · ≥ f(xσ(n)).
In particular, if u1 < u2 < · · · < un, σ can be the identity
permutation.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose i < j and
f(xi) < f(xj). We have
(f(xj)ui + f(xi)uj)− (f(xi)ui + f(xj)uj)
= (f(xj)− f(xi))(ui − uj) ≤ 0
and the inequality is strict if ui < uj . Thus, when ui < uj , if
we swap the features on target i and j, we would strictly im-
prove the solution, which contradicts x being optimal. When
ui = uj , we could swap the observed features on node i and
j, and strictly decrease the number of score inversions.
Lemma C.2. There exists an optimal observable feature con-
figuration x = (x1, . . . , xn) such that, for some j ∈ N−{n},
if i ≤ j, f(xi) = maxx′i f(x′i); otherwise, f(xi) =
minx′i f(x
′
i).
Proof. Let x be an optimal observable feature configuration.
Fix a target i ∈ N . Consider an alternative configuration
x˜i for target i, while keeping features of other targets un-
changed. We have
f(xi)ui +
∑
j 6=i f(xj)uj
f(xi) +
∑
j 6=i f(xj)
− f(x˜i)ui +
∑
j 6=i f(xj)uj
f(x˜i) +
∑
j 6=i f(xj)
∝
(f(xi)− f(x˜i))
∑
j 6=i
f(xj)(ui − uj)

Depending on its sign, we could improve the solution x by
making f(x˜i) greater or smaller than f(xi), and obviously
we should take it to extreme by setting f(x˜i) = maxx′i f(x
′
i)
or f(x˜i) = minx′i f(x
′
i). Since we assumed x is optimal,
then we know x˜ = (x˜i, x−i) is also optimal, with f(xˆi) at
an extreme value. By Lemma C.1, we could permute the fea-
tures in x˜ so that the scores are in decreasing order. After
applying the above argument repeatedly, the score of each tar-
get achieves either the maximum or minimum score possible.
Therefore, there exists some j ∈ N − {n}, such that
max
x′i
f(x′i) = f(x1) = · · · = f(xj)
≥ f(xj+1) = · · · = f(xn) = min
x′i
f(x′i)
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Figure 2: Experimental results
Theorem C.3. The optimal feature configuration can be
found in O(n log n+m) time.
Proof. We can do an exhaustive search on the “cut-off” node
j in Lemma C.2. With bookkeeping, the search can be done
in O(n) time. Since f is monotone in each observable fea-
ture, the maximum and minimum score can be found inO(m)
time. Sorting the targets’ losses takes O(n log n) time.
D Additional Experiments
D.1 Learning
In addition to the mean total variation distance reported in
the main text, we present another metric to measure the per-
formance of learning. We consider |θˆ− θ|, the L1 error in the
score function parameter θ, which directly relates to the sam-
ple complexity bound in Theorem 3.1. Since the dimension
of θ depends on the number of features k and other factors,
we consider the L1 error divided by the number of parameters
and report this metric in Fig. 2a and Fig. 2b.
For a single layer score function, the log-likelihood is con-
cave. Thus GD is expected to find the global maximizer. In-
deed, we see that in Fig 2a, the learning error is close to zero,
which corroborates this claim. The L1 error for CF also de-
creases as the sample size increases, though not as small as
GD. According to Theorem 3.1 we would need much more
samples than 2000 to achieve an error of 0.25.
For complex score function, the learning error is larger as
shown in Fig. 2b, even though Fig. 1b in the main text shows
the total variation distance is small. This suggests that the
loss surface for complex score function is, true to its name,
more complex. Comparing Fig. 2a- 2b with Fig. 1i- 1k, we
can obtain more intuition why the solution gap in Fig. 1k is
much larger than that in Fig. 1i.
D.2 Planning
We present the performance of our algorithms on some spe-
cial cases of FDG.
When all features are continuous, in addition to our MILP,
we may use non-convex solver or GD as a heuristic to find
optimal feature configurations. Fig. 2c shows that these two
heuristics scale better than the approximation algorithms. In
Fig. 1f and Fig. 1h, we showed that GD demonstrates the best
solution quality among the heuristics on complex score func-
tions. A natural question to ask is if GD is in practice close to
exact. In Fig. 2d, we show that at least when we have a single-
layer score function, GD solution is not far from optimal,
though its solution deteriorates as the problem size grows.
Non-convex solver yields relatively constant, and small, so-
lution gap as well.
When deception cost is only associated with discrete fea-
tures, we presented an exact MILP formulation in Ap-
pendix C.1. Fig. 2e shows that it is especially efficient on
smaller problems. Yet as the problem size grows its efficiency
decreases quickly.
Finally, in Appendix C.2, we proposed a O(n log n + m)
time algorithm for FDG without budget and feasibility con-
straints. Indeed, as shown in Fig. 2f, the algorithm’s run-
ning time is several magnitudes less than the MILP-based ap-
proaches.
E Experiment Parameter Distributions
Complex score function architecture The 3-layer neural
network score function has input layer of sizem×24, second
layer 24 × 12, and third layer 12 × 1. The first and second
layers are followed by a tanh activation, and the last layer
is followed by an exponential function. The neural network
parameters are initialized uniformly at random in [−0.5, 0.5].
We use this network architecture for all of our experiments.
FDG parameters for 1-layer score function We detail in
Table 2 the parameter distributions used in the planning and
combined learning and planning experiments, when the ad-
versary assumes the single-layer score function. These distri-
butions apply to the results shown in Fig. 1c, 1d, 1i, 1j.
FDG parameters for 3-layer score function We detail in
Table 3 the parameter distributions used in the planning and
Discrete feature k ∈Md Continuous feature k ∈Mc
Variable Distribution Variable Distribution
|Md| 2m/3 |Mc| m/3
ηik U(−3, 3) ηik U(0, 3)
τik τik U(0, 0.25)
xˆik U{0, 1} xˆik U(0, 1)
ui U(0, 1)
B U(0, 0.2Cmax
Cmax
∑
i∈N
∑
k∈Mc
ηik min(xˆik, 1− xˆik, τik) +
∑
k∈Md
ηik
Table 2: FDG parameter distributions for experiments on 1-layer
attacker score function. Used in Fig. 1c, 1d, 1i, 1j
combined learning and planning experiments, when the ad-
versary assumes the 3-layer score function. These distribu-
tions apply to the results shown in Fig. 1e,1f, 1g, 1h,1k, 1l.
Variable Distribution
ηik U(0, 1)
τik 1
xˆik U(0, 1)
ui U(0, 1)
B U(0, 0.2nm)
Table 3: FDG parameter distributions for experiments on 3-layer
attacker score function. Used in Fig. 1e,1f, 1g, 1h,1k, 1l
